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ABSTRACT 
Fiscal mimicking and yardstick competition among neighboring jurisdictions have been widely 
documented in developed countries with long histories of democracy. However, there is very little 
empirical evidence concerning these practices in developing countries with young democracies. Using a 
primary panel of 86 rural Chinese administrative villages that have undergone transitions to democracy 
over the last two decades, we show that the neighborhood effect also exists in a young democracy, albeit 
at a lower magnitude than in a mature democracy. Elected chairs of village committees who have served 
more than one term respond positively to the provision of public projects in neighboring villages by 
increasing both the number of public projects and the funding allocated to undertake them. In contrast, 
appointed party secretaries with more than one year of service are insensitive to neighbors’ performance. 
In addition, village leaders are strategic in timing the arrival of public projects to increase the probability 
of re-election: In the year preceding elections, both the number and budget of public projects increase 
significantly. In this sense, politicians in young and old democracies behave alike. 
Keywords:  China, public goods, neighbors 
JEL code: H41, H72, H77, P35 
   vi 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 
Funding supports from the Natural Science Foundation of China (Approval numbers 70525003 and 
70828002) are also gratefully acknowledged. The authors also thank staff and students from the Gansu 
Agricultural University for conducting the survey and Jin Yang for excellent research assistance. 
 1 
1.  INTRODUCTION 
Prior to the 1980s, local officials in China were appointed by higher-level authorities and were more 
concerned with satisfying superiors than with satisfying villagers (Fan 2001). However, the introduction 
of democracy in Chinese villages in 1980 may have shifted the objectives of elected officials toward 
providing public goods to constituents for two reasons: first, under democracy, the accountability of 
public officials increases, influencing the allocation of public resources; second, a democratic government 
responds to public demand because it faces elections in which voters determine whether or not its 
leadership serves additional terms (Besley and Coate 2003). 
Empirical evidence from China shows that local elections have in fact affected the level of public 
goods. For example, Rozelle et al. (2009) find that the provision of public goods is higher when village 
leaders are elected as opposed to being appointed. They argue that the reason for this result is that village 
leaders implementing more public projects are more likely to be re-elected. Similarly, Zhang et al. (2004) 
find that elections increase the share of public investment in total expenditures in villages. Finally, Wang 
and Yao (2007) find that village elections increase the share of public expenditures and reduce the share 
of administrative costs in government spending, which is consistent with the idea that elections 
significantly strengthen the accountability of village governments.
1
This possibility has been established in the literature through the theoretical models of fiscal 
mimicking and yardstick competition (for example, Case, Hines, and Rosen 1993; Besley and Case 
1995). In both models, the fiscal behavior of a local government is affected by the fiscal behavior of 
neighbor jurisdictions, and the empirical evidence has supported the theoretical predictions. An 
interesting question, then, is whether the performance of neighboring elected leaders matters to voters in a 
new democracy. Institutional differences in media, culture or education between developed and 
developing countries may impact interactions across jurisdictions. 
 However, Wang and Yao (2007) also 
show that elections have reduced fiscal sharing across villages, which may affect the provision of public 
goods that are complementary across villages. This suggests that interactions among villages may play an 
important role in the provision of public goods in China. 
However, most evidence to date comes from developed countries with long histories of 
democracy. One exception is Banejee et al. (2010). Using a field experiment in India, Banejee et al. 
(2010) find that those incumbents who performed worse than neighboring incumbents received fewer 
votes. In this paper, using a unique dataset from a poor Chinese province that has recently begun village-
level elections, we present additional evidence in support of the neighborhood effect that neighboring 
villages influence the provision of public goods by local governments. In contrast to many previous 
studies, public goods—including projects such as irrigation, terracing, and landslide control—are both 
highly relevant and fully observable to constituents. Moreover, because farmers are usually unable to 
undertake such projects privately (Zhang et al. 2004), these goods may be available only through local 
governments. Additionally, due to special institutional features of China, it is possible to investigate the 
different roles in the provision of public goods played by officials who are elected relative to those who 
are appointed. 
Our results show that an increase of RMB 1 on per capita spending on public projects in 
neighboring villages increases the amount spent in the home village by between RMB 0.11 and RMB 
0.20 on average, all else constant. Consistently, an increase by 1 in the number of public projects 
undertaken by neighbors increases the number of public projects undertaken in the home village by 
between 0.2 and 0.6. Additionally, we find evidence that the incumbency of elected officials—whether 
elected officials have previous served in office—significantly influences both the amount spent and the 
number of public projects implemented, while the incumbency of appointed officials does not. Finally, we 
                                                       
1 The explanation is consistent with the results of Kennedy et al. (2004), who find that openly elected leaders are more 
accountable to their constituencies than are appointed leaders as measured by the degree of satisfaction expressed by the villagers 
toward land management and reallocation policies. 2 
find evidence of political cycles, with higher provision of public goods in the years immediately 
preceding elections. 
The rest of this paper continues as follows: Section 2 reviews the institutional background, 
including China’s political organization, village democracy, and the provision of public goods; Section 3 
describes the unique survey data and the empirical specifications used in the analysis; Section 4 presents 
results; and Section 5 concludes. 3 
2.  INSTITUTIONAL BACKGROUND 
Fiscal Federalism in China 
China’s governing hierarchy is composed of five official levels—center, province, prefecture, county, and 
township. Each township is composed of several “administrative villages”; although administrative 
villages do not constitute a formal level of government, they mirror the administrative structures of higher 
levels of government, with both a Communist party branch and an administrative office (Zhang et al. 
2004). Each administrative village is then composed of multiple “natural villages,” each typically 
consisting of a few dozen households. 
China’s system of public finance may be referred to as “fiscal federalism,” in which each level 
has varying authority over taxation and expenditures. Although China was centrally planned for its first 
30 years, the rural fiscal system has undergone four major rounds of reforms since the start of market 
reforms in the early 1980s. The first round focused on the decentralization of the planned economy in 
order to prompt local governments to generate revenue (Luo et al. 2007). This reform resulted in 
significantly higher revenue for local governments, yet revenues accruing to the central government fell 
dramatically (Luo et al. 2007). The central government therefore recentralized the tax system in 1994, 
leaving local governments with lower revenues. 
In response, cash-strapped local governments recouped fiscal losses by implementing fees for 
services such as irrigation, terracing, and education, each of which was previously provided free of 
charge. New fees raised the potential for unrest in rural areas, spurring the central government to 
undertake additional reforms. At the end of the 1990s, the central government prohibited local 
governments from levying fees outside the standard taxation system (Tao and Liu 2005). To compensate 
for revenue shortfalls at the local level, county governments were compelled to increase direct transfers to 
townships and villages, generally by rebating surcharges on the agricultural tax (Yep 2004). The central 
government reduced peasants’ tax burden further by eliminating the 1,000-year-old agricultural tax 
altogether in 2005 (Meng and Meng 2007). Having lost the right to collect revenues, villages must now 
seek project funding from upper levels of government. 
Village Democracy 
Until the start of economic reforms in the late 1970s, both the party secretary (head of the local branch of 
the Communist party) and the chair of the village committee (head of the village administrative office) 
were appointed by bodies known as “people’s communes” (Zhang et al. 2004), which also served as the 
main supplier of public goods. However, with the advent of the household responsibility system in 1978, 
the commune system in place since the 1950s dissolved. Village committees consisting of three to seven 
appointed community members replaced production brigades as the predominant supplier of public goods 
in villages, and township governments replaced people’s communes as the primary local administrative 
unit (Shen and Yao 2008). 
Shortly thereafter, two counties in Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region began to experiment 
with electing village committee members as a means of addressing the broad political crisis associated 
with the breakdown of the communes (O’Brien and Li 2000). Furthermore, the chair of the Standing 
Committee of the National People’s Assembly, Peng Zhen, promoted village elections as an efficient 
means of simultaneously making local leaders accountable and stabilizing party rule in rural China (Wang 
and Yao 2007). Hence, the notion that village committees should be “self-governing bodies of villagers” 
was first written into the constitution in 1982 (article 111), and the National People’s Congress 
implemented the Organic Law of Village Committees in 1987, adopting it formally in 1998. This law 
mandated that village committees would henceforth be elected. Popular election has since become 
universal in Chinese villages (Wang and Yao 2007; Shen and Yao 2008), and elections are notable for 
their high participation rates. 4 
By law, the village committee is responsible for promoting public welfare through the provision 
of public goods, resolving disputes among villagers, assisting in maintaining social order, and 
communicating with upper levels of government regarding the opinions of the villagers (O’Brien and Li 
2000). Each village committee must include at least one woman and at least one member of the ethnicity 
with the fewest residents in the village (Yao 2008). The term is three years, with no term limits. 
Candidates for the village committee must be endorsed by at least 10 residents to be on the ballot. The 
chair of the village committee—elected by popular vote—is the executive and most influential member of 
the village committee. 
This grassroots democracy faces constraints from the authoritarian state bureaucratic structure. 
First, the village committee often shares decisionmaking authority with the local branch of the 
Communist party, whose members are appointed and may have different objectives from those of elected 
officials. Second, upper levels of government—including the township, county, and even prefectural 
levels—may appoint “village-stationed officials” to supervise local decisionmaking (Wu 2006). One key 
responsibility of these officials is to lobby upper levels of government for project funding. Third, while 
the nomination process for chair of the village committee rests in the hands of local villagers, some 
township governments continue to vet all candidates, and it is not uncommon for them to veto specific 
nominations. 
Public Goods in Chinese Villages 
While the purchasing power of peasants has risen as a result of China’s recent tax reforms, the fiscal 
health of local governments has deteriorated since responsibility for taxation was returned to the central 
government in 1994 (Luo et al. 2007). In rural areas, where revenue collection is lowest, the 
comprehensive provision of public goods has also eroded. To encourage public investment in critical 
areas such as agriculture, transportation, education, health, and community development, the central 
government introduced the Zhengcun Tuijin (“push the entire village”) program in 1995 (Ren 2007). 
Under this program, village committees submit project proposals to county governments together with 
comprehensive strategic plans for their administrative villages. The best proposals are escalated to the 
prefecture or province governments, which fund them on a competitive basis. Money for funded projects 
is appropriated to the administrative village, where the village committee oversees implementation (the 
party secretary is often charged with monitoring the use of funds), and villagers are often required to 
supply labor without compensation for funded projects (Ren 2007). 
The Zhengcun Tuijin program thus creates a bidding process in which villages within a county 
compete against each other for project funding. Hence, village committees that are competent in 
designing high-quality projects or well connected to decisionmakers in higher levels of government, or 
both, are more likely to see their proposals funded. In our survey data, funds from this program account 
for 84 percent of revenues in administrative villages on average. Other sources of revenue include 
operating income and fees from village-owned enterprises; operating income and rent from agricultural 
land, forests, and water owned by the village; fines for violating family planning and other social policies; 
and income from village accounts (Wang and Yao 2007). 5 
3.  DATA AND EMPIRICAL SPECIFICATIONS 
The data come from the first two waves of the Public Policy and Rural Poverty Surveys, conducted 
jointly by Northwest Agricultural University and the International Food Policy Research Institute in 2004 
and 2007 in Gansu Province in northwestern China. The 26 million people living in Gansu are primarily 
engaged in agricultural production, with three-fourths of the population officially designated as rural. 
With a rural income of RMB 2329 per capita in 2007, Gansu is China’s poorest province, noted for its 
low productivity and low investment levels. 
Three nationally designated poor counties—Huining, Tianzhu, and Weiyuan —were selected to 
represent Gansu’s geographic diversity. Huining is east of the capital of Gansu, Lanzhou, and close to 
Ningxia Province. It suffers from serious water shortages that greatly inhibit agricultural production. 
Weiyuan lies to the south of Lanzhou. Home to the source of the Weihe River, the county is well known 
for its agricultural production, with wheat, potatoes, and maize as major crops, as well as high 
concentrations of angelica, codonopsis, and other Chinese herbs. Tianzhu is situated to the northwest of 
Lanzhou on the Qianghai border, and livestock production is the major source of income. 
In each county, three townships were randomly chosen and all the villages in the selected 
townships were surveyed. In total, the sample includes 86 administrative villages, including 31 in Huining 
County, 22 in Tianzhu County, and 35 in Weiyuan County. The surveys, conducted in both 2004 and 
2007, were administered to village leaders and village accountants. 
The surveys included detailed questions on the socioeconomic status of each village, 
characteristics of the chairs of the village committees and of the party secretaries, revenues and their 
sources, and the provision of public goods. The specific public goods considered included projects for fire 
suppression; drainage improvement; erosion and landslide control; terracing land for cultivation; 
improving environmental conditions; collecting solar energy; and connecting the village to electricity, 
telephone, and cable television grids. Also addressed were programs promoted by the central government, 
including the Grain to Green program, the Grassland Development program, animal husbandry projects, 
agricultural research and extension services, and development of cultural venues. Importantly—and in 
contrast to much of the literature that analyzes public goods provision—each of these projects is both 
observable (in contrast to, say, defense spending) and relevant to farmers. Moreover, funding for these 
projects is almost always provided by upper levels of government, unlike projects such as road 
construction. 
Based on the prevailing evidence on the determinants of public spending in other countries and 
the specific institutional details in rural China, we use the following econometric specification to estimate 
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where Gpc is the per capita spending on public projects in administrative village i at time t; w is a weight 
of the per capita spending on publically observable projects undertaken by each neighbor j; Leaders 
describes the incumbency of the chair of the village committee and the party secretary; Concentration 
describes the type of land under cultivation and the share of the total population in the largest three 
natural villages in each administrative village to control for the relative cost of providing public goods; 
Shocks are exogenous economic shocks that negatively affect income in the village, potentially reducing 
its ability to fund public goods; Income is a measure of average village income; and Elections describes 
political cycles that may affect public spending. 
Because the level of spending on public projects in administrative villages may be difficult for 
individuals to assess, we also measure the quantity of public goods provided using a count variable. In 
this case, the econometric specification is a non-linear count model: 6 
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where Projects is the number of public projects undertaken in village i at time t and w is a weight of the 
number of publically observable projects undertaken by each neighbor j. Again, each of the projects that 
we consider is both observable and relevant to the local population. 
Like most papers that have analyzed the effect of neighbor spending on public goods on own 
provision of public goods (for example, Heyndels and Vuchelen 1998; Revelli 2002; Bordignon, 
Cerniglia, and Revelli 2003; Sole-Olle 2003; Geys 2006, Lundberg 2006; Vermeir and Heyndels 2006), 
we define neighbors by geography, specifically shared borders. Although the literature has also 
experimented with defining neighbors by ethnicity and income, Bourginion Cerniglia, and Revelli (2003) 
argue that information flows most easily among areas that share borders.
2 Moreover, neither ethnicity nor 
income is an appropriate indicator of neighbors in the case of rural Gansu because 92 percent of Gansu’s 
population is ethnically Han
3 and because all of the townships in our sample are ethnically homogenous. 
In addition, farmers normally frequent markets in nearby townships and the county seat, rarely venturing 
outside their own counties.
4
Hence, the weight of the per capita spending on publically observable projects undertaken by 
each neighbor j (or, alternatively, the number of projects) is calculated as follows: 
 Therefore, people know their neighboring villages well. 
  ,  (3) 
where Ni is the total number of villages that share a border with village i. We obtain the geographic 
boundaries based on local maps, and since we survey all of the administrative villages within each 
township, we are able to identify each administrative village’s neighbors. 
Table 1 provides summary statistics for the data used in the empirical analysis. On average, 
administrative villages spend RMB 69 per capita on observable public goods, but there is a large variation 
across villages and over time (Figure 1), with per capita spending in any given year ranging from zero to 
RMB 2762. Restricting the data to administrative villages that undertook one or more of the public 
projects listed above, the mean spending per capita is RMB 167. The number of projects undertaken by 
administrative villages in any given year ranges from 0 to 6, with a mean of 0.4. 
Leaders is measured via dummy variables that equal one if the chair of the village committee and 
the party secretary have been in office for more than just the current term and zero if the current term is 
his or her first. Nearly one-third of chairs have served at least one term while nearly half of secretaries 
have done so. Concentration includes Herfindahl-Hirschman indexes (HHI) that describe the type of land 
under cultivation and the share of the total population in the largest three natural villages in each 
administrative village. The former controls for the relative cost of providing public goods because 
economies of scale are higher if village land types are more homogenous—for example, if all land is 
located in a valley. The latter controls for the distribution of population across natural villages within an 
administrative village. A high HHI means that one natural village dominates village affairs because 
population is concentrated in one place. Under this situation, it is more likely for the natural village to 
push its agenda in the village committee. The mean HHIs are 0.69 and 0.34, respectively, suggesting that 
while land type is rather homogenous, the population distribution among natural villages is more variable. 
Shocks is measured by the number of exogenous negative economic shocks affecting each administrative 
village in each year; on average, villages experience one shock per year, although this number 
                                                       
2 In general, there are no significant changes when using different w matrices, and geography fits the data better than other 
alternatives (Brueckner and Saavedra 2001; Edmark and Agren 2008). 
3 Moreover, the two largest minority groups in Gansu, Tibetans and Hui, largely reside in “autonomous” counties in which 
each forms the majority ethnic group.  
4 Indeed, most rural marriages occur within counties as well (Wei and Zhang 2009). 7 
demonstrates high variability. Because off-farm work has provided an increasing share of household 
income in Gansu, Income is measured via both nonfarm income and agricultural income. The mean 
nonfarm and agricultural incomes are RMB 328 and RMB 375, respectively. Finally, political cycles are 
measured via a dummy indicating the second year of the electoral cycle because spending on public goods 
escalates in this year in anticipation of elections in the third year of the cycle. 
Table 1. Summary statistics 
Variable  Unit  Mean  S.D.  Min.  Max. 
Per capita spending on projects  RMB  69.08  183.29  0  2762.43 
Weighted per capita spending on projects  
    in neighboring areas  RMB  57.48  146.33  0  3512.88 
Number of projects completed  #  0.77  1.09  0  6 
Weighted number of projects completed  
    in neighboring areas  #  0.67  0.82  0  6.5 
Incumbent chair of the village    
    committee  1/0  0.32  0.47  0  1 
Incumbent party secretary  1/0  0.48  0.50  0  1 
Herfindahl index for type of  
    land under cultivation  Index  0.69  0.28  0  1 
Herfindahl index for share of  
    population in each natural village   Index  0.34  0.16  0  1 
Village level income shocks  #  0.96  0.65  0  5 
Nonfarm income  RMB  327.70  186.96  0  1200 
Agricultural income  RMB  374.52  199.09  20  1200 
Year 2 of electoral cycle  1/0  0.36  0.48  0  1 
Source: Public Policy and Rural Poverty Surveys. 
Figure 1. Mean number of projects undertaken in surveyed areas, by township and year 
 
Source: Public Policy and Rural Poverty Surveys. 8 
4.  RESULTS  
Table 2 shows the results of estimating equation (1) for the total per capita spending on projects in the 
administrative village. All results include township fixed effects to control for unobserved heterogeneity 
that may affect all administrative villages within each township. Although using village fixed effects may 
allow for even stronger inference than using township fixed effects, it is not possible to obtain precise 
estimates given the relatively small sample size. Hence, random effects are implemented to control for 
unobserved heterogeneity across villages. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are reported in 
parentheses. 
Table 2. Spending per capita, full sample 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Weighted per capita spending   0.109***  0.109***  0.217*  0.213* 
    In neighboring areas  (0.04)  (0.03)  (0.13)  (0.11) 
Incumbent chair of the   32.653**  32.526**  32.853**  32.714** 
    Village committee  (15.56)  (15.56)  (15.96)  (13.05) 
Incumbent party secretary    -5.375    -5.544 
     (12.65)    (12.34) 
Herfindahl index for type of   72.705*  72.186*  74.872**  74.253*** 
    Land under cultivation  (38.01)  (38.35)  (31.19)  (26.22) 
Herfindahl index for share of  68.747  68.002  67.827  67.094 
    Population in each natural village  (56.93)  (57.42)  (58.10)  (47.00) 
Village-level income shocks  -5.663  -5.473  -5.176  -4.999 
  (8.85)  (9.04)  (8.40)  (10.15) 
Log nonfarm income  29.917***  30.117***  26.984***  27.304*** 
  (5.77)  (5.73)  (9.28)  (8.95) 
Log agricultural income  7.944  8.318  6.574  7.012 
  (9.17)  (9.21)  (8.60)  (10.90) 
Year 2 of electoral cycle  33.068***  33.025***  29.278**  29.380** 
  (12.61)  (12.59)  (12.36)  (12.99) 
N  911  911  911  911 
R
2  0.207  0.212  0.200  0.205 
Wald χ
2  59.07  59.21  55.74  55.78 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
Notes: Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are presented in parentheses in specifications (1) and (2). Bootstrapped standard 
errors are reported in parentheses in specifications (3) and (4).  
* significant at the 10 percent level; ** significant at the 5 percent level; *** significant at the 1 percent level 
The most interesting effects for the purpose of this paper are weighted per capita spending on 
public goods by neighbors, incumbency of the chair of the village committee, and incumbency of the 
party secretary. The effect of neighbor spending—specification (1)—is positive and significant, which is 
consistent with mimicking, yardstick competition, or both among geographic neighbors. However, the 
effect is not large compared to that found in most results from developed countries. Specifically, an 
increase of RMB 1 in neighbors’ per capita spending on public goods is associated with a RMB 0.11 
increase in per capita spending in the home administrative village (significant at the one percent level), 
lower than the estimated elasticity of 0.63 for French municipalities (Foucalt, Madies, and Paty 2008), 
0.67 for English non-metropolitan districts (Revelli 2002), and 1.00 for U.S. states (Baicker 2005). This 
finding may reflect the fact that China’s democracy is young; it is plausible that these effects will grow 
over time, particularly for public goods that complement those in neighboring areas. 
Incumbent chairs of the village committee are associated with greater spending on public goods, 
an effect that is both large and statistically significant at the five percent level. On average, an 9 
administrative village with an incumbent chair spends RMB 32.6 more per capita on public goods than an 
administrative village with a new chair, suggesting that an incumbent chair of the village committee has 
stronger ties to upper levels of government. This result is consistent with Costa-i-Font, Rodriguez-
Oreggia, and Lunapla (2003), who show that Mexican municipalities receive greater appropriations for 
public projects when their mayors identify with the same political parties as higher-level governmental 
authorities. 
Specification (2) considers the additional effect of an incumbent party secretary on spending on 
public goods, but the point estimate is statistically indistinguishable from zero. This result shows that 
chairs of the village committee, who are elected, have a greater impact on public spending than do party 
secretaries, who are appointed, even though the latter can also lobby higher levels of government for 
funding for public projects. 
Unfortunately, both of the above specifications may suffer from simultaneity bias if spending on 
public goods in the administrative village influences neighbor spending as well as the reverse. To obtain 
consistent estimates of the effects of neighbor spending on public goods, specifications (3) and (4) re-
estimate specifications (1) and (2) while employing instrumental variables to identify the level of 
spending in neighboring villages.
5
Using instrumental variables estimation and bootstrapped standard errors (with 500 replications), 
the point estimates for neighbor spending remain significant. Now, however, an increase of RMB 1 in 
neighbors’ per capita spending on public goods increases own per capita spending on public goods by 
RMB 0.21. While the point estimate is twice the magnitude obtained without instrumenting,
 Specifically, the weighted number of negative economic shocks and 
the weighted per capita nonfarm and agricultural income are used to instrument for the weighted average 
of neighbors’ per capita spending on public goods. The instruments are strongly significant in the first 
stage, by themselves as well as jointly, with an F-statistic for the joint significance of the instruments of 
149.9. Full results from the first-stage estimates are presented in Appendix Table A.1. 
6
Point estimates for all other variables are quite robust and of similar magnitude across all four 
specifications. The HHI for the type of land under cultivation is positive and significant, with a 1 percent 
increase in land concentration being associated with a 0.73 percent increase in per capita spending on 
public goods, reflecting potential economies of scale in the production costs of public projects. The HHI 
describing the distribution of population across natural villages is positively correlated with spending on 
public goods, perhaps because collective action is more common in concentrated villages, although the 
effects are not quite statistically significant. The estimated effect of economic shocks on spending on 
public goods is negative, although the effect is not statistically significant. The income variables are both 
positive as expected, although the estimated effect of agricultural income is not significant, perhaps 
because a sizable portion of agricultural product is eaten by the household. The income elasticity of 
nonfarm income on per capita spending on public goods in the administrative village is 0.43. Timing 
within the electoral cycle is also an important determinant of spending on public goods: In the year before 
elections are held, per capita spending on public projects increases between RMB 29 and RMB 33 on 
average, an impact of similar magnitude as having an incumbent chair of the village committee instead of 
a newcomer. This result is consistent with Foucalt, Madies, and Paty (2008), who document that spending 
on public goods escalates sharply just before elections in French municipalities. 
 it remains 
well below the estimated effects in developed countries. The estimated effects of incumbent chairs of the 
village committee and party secretaries remain unchanged. 
To allow for a separate data-generating process in the second year of the election cycle relative to 
other years, we repeat the analysis by restricting the sample to the projects undertaken in 1997, 2000, 
                                                       
5 Kelejian and Prucha (1997) show that instrumental variables provide consistent estimates even in the presence of spatial 
error dependence. Indeed, instrumental variables have commonly been used to deal with this potential type of endogeneity; see, 
for example, Ladd (1992); Kelejian and Robinson (1993); Heyndels and Vuchelen (1998); Figlio, Kolpin, and Reid (1999); Brett 
and Pinske (2000); Buettner (2001); Revelli (2001); and Fredricksson and Millimet (2002). 
6 Revelli (2002) also finds that point estimates for the effects of neighbors increase with instrumental variables in the context 
of taxation.  10 
2003, and 2006 (Appendix Table A.2). With the exception of the IV results shown in specifications (3) 
and (4), neighborhood effects continue to influence spending strongly in the home administrative village. 
Because the level of spending on public projects in administrative villages may be difficult for 
individuals to assess, we also measure the provision of public goods by counting the number of 
observable projects undertaken (the full list of project types is provided in the previous section). Table 3 
presents the results of estimating equation (2) using a negative binomial model with random effects.
7
Table 3. Number of projects completed, full sample 
 
Bootstrapped standard errors with 500 replications are reported in parentheses. As before, specification 
(1) provides the main result while specification (2) adds a measure of the incumbency of the party 
secretary. Specifications (3) and (4) re-estimate these specifications using instrumental variables for the 
neighbors’ numbers of projects (the F-statistic for the joint significance of the instruments is 62.3). 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Weighted per capita spending   0.606***  0.601***  0.547**  0.510*** 
    In neighboring areas  (0.03)  (0.11)  (0.26)  (0.15) 
Incumbent chair of the   0.136***  0.129***  0.115***  0.102* 
    Village committee  (0.05)  (0.03)  (0.03)  (0.06) 
Incumbent party secretary    -0.227    -0.227 
    (0.31)    (0.29) 
Herfindahl index for type of   0.828***  0.808***  0.799***  0.775** 
    Land under cultivation  (0.19)  (0.19)  (0.23)  (0.34) 
Herfindahl index for share of  1.289***  1.274***  1.234***  1.211*** 
    Population in each natural village  (0.40)  (0.38)  (0.35)  (0.35) 
Village-level income shocks  -0.068  -0.052  -0.038  -0.020 
  (0.12)  (0.08)  (0.08)  (0.07) 
Log nonfarm income  0.299***  0.311**  0.348***  0.361*** 
  (0.07)  (0.12)  (0.07)  (0.11) 
Log agricultural income  0.067  0.085  0.085  0.104 
  (0.10)  (0.10)  (0.12)  (0.13) 
Year 2 of electoral cycle  0.292*  0.291**  0.340*  0.343*** 
  (0.16)  (0.12)  (0.18)  (0.11) 
N  911  911  911  911 
Wald χ
2  136.99  140.09  69.32  72.94 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
Notes: Bootstrapped standard errors are reported in parentheses.  
* significant at the 10 percent level; ** significant at the 5 percent level; *** significant at the 1 percent level 
Results are qualitatively similar to those for per capita spending on public projects and are also 
robust across specifications. Increasing the number of projects in neighboring villages by 1 is associated 
with an increase of between 0.51 and 0.60 projects in the home administrative village if the linear 
prediction of the model (reported in the table) is considered. If the nonlinear prediction (not reported) is 
used instead, the marginal effect of an additional project in neighboring villages is an increase in the 
number of projects undertaken in the home administrative village by 0.20, based on the model 
assumptions that the expected value of the unobserved heterogeneity is zero. This result holds when the 
sample is restricted to the years in which election spending escalates (Appendix Table A.3). 
Villages with an incumbent chair of the village committee have between 0.05 (nonlinear 
prediction) and 0.14 (linear prediction) more public projects than other villages, further demonstrating the 
influence of a chair of the village committee whose experience and connections with upper levels of 
government enable more projects to be undertaken. Although the magnitude of the point estimate is small, 
                                                       
7 The Poisson model was rejected over the negative binomial model due to overdispersion. 11 
the average number of projects from our list undertaken in any given year is just 0.7, suggesting that 
having an incumbent chair is both economically and statistically significant. On the other hand, an 
incumbent party secretary seems to play no role in the number of projects executed in a village: Although 
the coefficient is negative, the effect is statistically not different from zero. Again, these effects hold in 
the restricted sample as well. 
The estimated effects of the HHI for the type of land under cultivation and the HHI for the 
distribution of population across natural villages are both positive and statistically significant at the one 
percent level. The marginal effect of increasing the concentration of land type is to increase the estimated 
number of projects by between 0.3 (nonlinear effect) and 0.8 (linear effect); the marginal effect of 
increasing the concentration of population is to increase the number of projects undertaken by between 
0.5 (nonlinear effect) and 1.2 (linear effect). Economies of scale may explain the latter result, but it may 
also be the case that public projects undertaken in population-dense areas are more likely to be funded by 
upper levels of government. 
Point estimates for negative economic shocks are consistently negative but not statistically 
distinguishable from zero. Nonfarm income has a statistically significant and positive effect, as expected, 
with a linear marginal effect of approximately 0.30 (nonlinear 0.11) in the project count, on average. 
Agricultural income has a very small positive effect, but it is not statistically significant. Finally, the 
estimated effect of timing within the electoral cycle confirms the political cycle found above: The number 
of projects undertaken in the administrative village increases by between 0.12 (nonlinear effect) and 0.30 
(linear effect), on average, in the year preceding an election, all else constant. 
The results presented here are quite robust to alternative specifications. In particular, they are 
robust to different functional forms and to including other variables such as the age and education of the 
village leadership, the concentration of family clans in the administrative village, and other measures of 
political cycles. We also considered instrumental variables for the incumbency of the chair of the village 
committee and party secretary. However, the point estimates for the newly added variables were not 
statistically significant, and their inclusion did not substantively change any of our results. 12 
5.  CONCLUSION 
Fiscal mimicking and yardstick competition among neighboring jurisdictions have been widely 
documented in developed countries with a long history of democracy. However, no studies of which we 
are aware have provided empirical evidence for developing countries with young democracies. Using a 
primary panel of 86 rural Chinese administrative villages that have undergone transitions to democracy 
over the last two decades, we find that the neighborhood effect persists, albeit in lower magnitude than in 
mature democracies. Incumbent elected chairs of village committees positively respond to the provision 
of public projects in neighboring villages by increasing both the quantity of public projects and the 
funding allocated to undertake them. In contrast, incumbent appointed party secretaries are insensitive to 
neighbors’ performance. 
Apart from the neighborhood effect, our results also show that elected chairs are strategic in 
timing the arrival of public projects so as to increase their chance of re-election: In the year prior to an 
election, both the number and the budget of public projects jump significantly, suggesting that politicians 
in young democracies do not act much differently from those in mature democracies. 
Given that China will likely extend local elections to upper levels of government in the future, 
findings at the village level may shed important light on the behavior of elected and appointed leaders. As 
a future research project, it would be interesting to study whether the neighborhood effect increases over 
time to a level similar to that observed in developed countries.   13 
APPENDIX: SUPPLEMENTARY TABLES 
 Table A.1. First-stage regression for weighted per capita spending in neighboring areas 








Incumbent chair of the   4.372  4.279  10.411  10.212 
    Village committee  (9.84)  (9.80)  (13.25)  (13.28) 
Incumbent party secretary    9.289    -4.332 
    (9.25)    (12.65) 
Herfindahl Index for type of   -33.103  -32.259  -3.717  -4.178 
    Land under cultivation  (21)  (20)  (27)  (27) 
Herfindahl Index for share of  -4.127  -2.626  8.021  7.287 
    Population in each natural village  (37)  (37)  (48)  (48) 
Village-level income shocks  -6.677  -7.059  6.051  6.312 
  (7.68)  (7.67)  (9.71)  (9.76) 
Log nonfarm income  7.088  6.997  20.452**  20.666** 
  (6.61)  (6.58)  (8.74)  (8.77) 
Log agricultural income  11.628  10.972  14.669  14.925 
  (8.23)  (8.20)  (10.48)  (10.52) 
Year 2 of electoral cycle  29.044***  29.088***     
  (9.16)  (9.18)     
Weighted number of village-level income 
shocks   45.265***  45.552***  24.373  23.931 
    In neighboring areas  (14.16)  (14.15)  (17.65)  (17.72) 
Weighted log nonfarm income   82.252***  82.100***  46.493***  46.286*** 
    In neighboring areas  (8.38)  (8.36)  (10.71)  (10.74) 
Weighted log agricultural income   -78.637***  -78.422***  -31.544***  -31.280*** 
    In neighboring areas  (7.71)  (7.69)  (10.09)  (10.13) 
N  911  911  332  332 
F-statistic for joint significance  
    of the instruments  149.87  150.85  63.15  62.26 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
Notes: Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are presented in parentheses.  
* significant at the 10 percent level; ** significant at the 5 percent level; *** significant at the 1 percent level 14 
Table A.2. Spending per capita, sample restricted to second year of election cycle 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Weighted per capita spending   0.246***  0.245***  0.062  0.056 
    in neighboring areas  (0.07)  (0.08)  (0.17)  (0.21) 
Incumbent chair of the   54.566*  54.422*  55.504*  55.312** 
    village committee  (29.98)  (29.66)  (29.04)  (22.02) 
Incumbent party secretary    -4.334    -6.503 
     (21.48)    (18.43) 
Herfindahl index for type of   89.363**  88.851**  89.631**  88.870** 
    land under cultivation  -43.133  (42.71)  -45.203  (41.16) 
Herfindahl index for share of  26.141  25.339  23.851  22.591 
    population in each natural village  (85.50)  (86.58)  (81.81)  (80.43) 
Village-level income shocks  -6.968  -6.707  -6.41  -6.004 
  (11.76)  (11.73)  (10.83)  (11.49) 
Log nonfarm income  39.138***  39.318***  44.620***  45.025*** 
  (11.72)  (11.88)  (13.96)  (10.98) 
Log agricultural income  3.183  3.458  7.159  7.67 
  (14.55)  (14.70)  (18.54)  (18.26) 
N  332  332  332  332 
R
2  0.094  0.094  0.082  0.081 
Wald χ
2  32.68  32.62  24.84  24.83 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
Notes: Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are presented in parentheses in specifications (1) and (2). Bootstrapped standard 
errors are reported in parentheses in specifications (3) and (4).  
* significant at the 10 percent level; ** significant at the 5 percent level; *** significant at the 1 percent level 
Table A.3. Number of projects completed, sample restricted to second year of election cycle 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Weighted number of projects   0.595***  0.594**  0.601**  0.587** 
    In neighboring areas  (0.19)  (0.23)  (0.26)  (0.27) 
Incumbent chair of the   0.340*  0.337**  0.263*  0.255* 
    Village committee  (0.19)  (0.15)  (0.16)  (0.15) 
Incumbent party secretary    -0.139    -0.133 
     (0.16)    (0.30) 
Herfindahl index for type of   0.923***  0.908***  0.930***  0.914*** 
    Land under cultivation  (0.22)  (0.34)  (0.31)  (0.34) 
Herfindahl index for share of  1.011**  0.983**  0.952*  0.927 
    Population in each natural village  (0.46)  (0.44)  (0.51)  (0.66) 
Village-level income shocks  -0.002  0.007  0.028  0.039 
  (0.21)  (0.11)  (0.11)  (0.20) 
Log nonfarm income  0.255**  0.264***  0.296*  0.304** 
  (0.10)  (0.04)  (0.16)  (0.13) 
Log agricultural income  0.188**  0.192  0.198*  0.204 
  (0.09)  (0.14)  (0.11)  (0.21) 
N  332  332  332  332 
Wald χ
2  72.84  73.32  37.90  38.39 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
Notes: Bootstrapped standard errors are reported in parentheses.  
* significant at the 10 percent level; ** significant at the 5 percent level; *** significant at the 1 percent level 15 
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